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An Aristotelian Account of Autonomy 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to set out an Aristotelian account of individual 
autonomy.  Individual autonomy is the capacity of the individual to make 
and act upon judgments for which he is held morally accountable.  This 
sense of autonomy may be contrasted to a number of other senses.  Of 
these, the most important are political or legal autonomy and Kantian 
principled autonomy.  Political or legal autonomy concerns the environment 
in which an individual operates.  It exists where individuals are able to 
operate reasonably freely.1  For the most part we will not consider this 
sense except insofar as it is necessary to explain the importance placed on 
respecting individual autonomy.  Kantian principled autonomy has been 
described recently by Onora O‟Neill in a series of writings.2  On this 
account, autonomy is seen as a characteristic of the principle behind action 
rather than of action per se and is not a characteristic of agents at all.   
 O‟Neill developed her Kantian account of autonomy in response to 
difficulties she perceives in the individual view of autonomy, the view that it 
is an attribute of most adults and their actions.  She says its central 
difficulty lies in reconciling a naturalist view of action, in which human 
action is seen as due to natural states of beliefs and desires, with the view 
that such action nonetheless is morally of great or supreme value.  In order 
to attribute autonomy to most adults and their actions, someone holding to 
an individual view of autonomy will need to define autonomy in terms of 
criteria that are generally shared.  These are usually naturalist.  For 
example, autonomous actions will be defined as those that are unfettered 
and arise from an agent's desires.  O‟Neill holds that excessive weight is 
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placed upon such minimal and implausible conceptions of individual 
autonomy.  This difficulty is seen in situations where the principle of 
respect for autonomy is thought to bear as much upon bad, poorly thought 
through and habitual decisions as it does upon good and fully rational 
decisions.  It is difficult to see how autonomy can be morally special once it 
has been defined in terms of natural features that are widely shared.  How 
could actions arising from the unfettered desires of someone who is acting 
immorally or amorally be thought to be of moral importance?  The 
Aristotelian account we will consider here is not vulnerable to this criticism 
largely because it is naturalist through and through.  Someone who holds 
to the account would not accept O'Neill's implicit assumption that moral 
considerations are separate from prudential considerations.   
 
2. Autonomy: beliefs and puzzles 
Aristotle's method has been extensively discussed.  In the discussion of an 
ethical concept or issue, Aristotle draws upon the different, credible views 
and beliefs about it.  Views are credible if they are held either by many 
people or by the wise.3  Aristotle also requires that we attend to relevant 
puzzles.  Indeed, inquiry will be stimulated by their presence.  The puzzles 
may arise because credible views conflict with each other or because they 
do not give a complete explanation.   
 A satisfactory account of an ethical concept or issue will enable us to 
explain the different views and beliefs and resolve the puzzles.  It will 
enable us to show which beliefs are true and which are false.  It will also 
enable us to show why beliefs that are false appeared to be true.  Where 
there are puzzles of incomplete knowledge it will enable us to offer new, 
correct, beliefs.  This is a somewhat over-linear description of Aristotle's 
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method.  The process is far more fluid than this, with new puzzles emerging 
alongside new beliefs.     
 There seem to be a number of sources for the views of most people 
and of wise people on the concept of autonomy.  The views of wise people 
are reasonably easy to elicit either from direct discussion of the topic or 
from discussions of related topics.  The views of most people may be elicited 
in at least two ways.  The first is through their explicit views on related 
topics.  For example, empirical research on the opinions of patients of the 
value of informed consent suggests that people do value their autonomy 
over matters of health.4 The second source is through thought experiments. 
For example, it is common to suggest that the intuitive abhorrence felt by 
most people toward the social order described in Aldous Huxley‟s Brave 
New World, in which people are rendered content but non-autonomous by 
drugs, is suggestive of the intrinsic value placed on autonomy.5   From such 
sources it is possible to set out the beliefs and puzzles.  In both cases they 
can be divided into those to do with the nature of autonomy, and those to 
do with its value.   
 Beginning, then, with the nature of autonomy, the term "autonomy" 
suggests self-rule and sovereignty over action.  This means more than being 
unconstrained, or at liberty.  Thus autonomy involves more than just being 
free.6  A young child, a psychotic adult, and an animal may all be 
unconstrained without being autonomous.  Typically, it is rational agents 
who are said to be autonomous.7 However, rational agents are not 
autonomous where they act upon desires implanted in them involuntarily 
through, for example, hypnosis or brainwashing.  Such desires have been 
termed “alien desires.”8  However, the majority of adult human beings are 
autonomous and, most of the time, act autonomously.9 
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 Autonomy has two dimensions.10  It applies to both actions and 
agents.  It is probable that an action is autonomous only when performed 
by an autonomous agent but it is not always the case that an act performed 
by such an agent is autonomous.  For example, if an autonomous agent is 
coerced, or is ignorant of significant features of her act, then she may not 
act autonomously.  Typically, the sorts of criteria offered for an autonomous 
act are that the agent is autonomous, that the agent is sufficiently informed 
and that the agent acts voluntarily.11    
   One final set of beliefs concerns the connection of autonomy with 
moral responsibility.12  It seems probable that it is a necessary condition for 
holding someone morally responsible for an action that he be an 
autonomous agent.  Where an autonomous agent acts autonomously it is 
probable also that this will be a sufficient condition for holding him morally 
responsible.  There is a grey zone of negligent actions for which agents are 
held responsible but which do not seem autonomous.   
 It seems that autonomy is held to be of value in two ways.  In the first 
place, it is important that autonomy develops in human agents.  Inasmuch 
as autonomy is linked to rationality, the development of the two qualities 
seems intertwined.  When autonomy does not develop or when it is lost, 
due to illness, accident or disability, it is seen as a tragedy.  It is also 
important that autonomy is respected.  It is seen as outrageous if 
autonomous agents are not permitted to make both important and trivial 
decisions about their lives. This is so even if an individual makes bad 
decisions.13   
 The puzzles concerning autonomy can be similarly divided into 
puzzles to do with the nature of autonomy and puzzles to do with the value 
of autonomy.  On the nature of autonomy, an account of autonomy needs 
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to indicate criteria of autonomous agency and action.  For example, it 
should allow us to determine whether we take the self-destructive action of 
a spurned young person to be autonomous.14  The account should also 
allow us to determine how autonomy is related to moral responsibility.  
Generally we would hold that autonomy of agency and action is necessary 
in order to hold someone morally responsible for what she does.  However, 
the relationship is not straightforward.  We sometimes hold people morally 
responsible for acts that do not seem autonomous, as when a driver 
unknowingly breaks a local by-law.   
 On the value of autonomy, the key problem is that while it is widely 
accepted that the development and exercise of autonomy is of great value, it 
is not the only thing of value.  There will be occasions when, in particular, 
the exercise of autonomy may clash with another value.  A simple example 
of such a clash occurs when governments legislate against riding 
motorcycles without crash helmets.  A good account of autonomy needs to 
allow us to determine where autonomy sits in the array of values. 
 
The Nature of Autonomy 
Autonomy is linked to moral responsibility.  In the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle says that praise and blame attach only to voluntary action and 
feelings.15  An act is voluntary only if two conditions are met. The first is 
that the origin of the act is in the agent. This means that the act occurs 
because of the agent‟s desires and perceptions or beliefs.  The second 
condition is that the agent has sufficient relevant knowledge concerning the 
act. This means there are no particulars concerning the act that the agent 
should know but does not.  „Friendly fire‟ in war is, sometimes, an example 
of involuntary action.   
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 However, according to Aristotle, voluntariness is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, criterion for moral responsibility.  Animals and children are 
capable of voluntary action but are not morally responsible.16  The 
difference between the non-culpable voluntary action of animals and the 
culpable voluntary action of human adults lies in the different types of 
desire from which such action arises.   
 All animals, including human beings, are self-movers, capable of 
initiating movement without first being acted upon.  What motivates them 
to move is the presence of a desire and some kind of belief or perception 
that the object of desire or avoidance can be obtained or avoided through 
action.  From these two factors the animal will move unless there are any 
countervailing forces. 
 Animals are capable only of non-rational desire.  The main type is 
appetite.   This is a desire for something as pleasant.  Reason is not 
involved in the process whereby appetite leads to action.  For example, an 
animal that is thirsty and sees drink will immediately drink.  This is the 
typical pattern of all non-human voluntary action.  Animals are 
teleologically organised such that what they desire is, for the most part, 
what is good for them and their species.17  Therefore, in pursuing pleasures 
animals also pursue their good, but they do not do this consciously.  As 
such, although they act voluntarily, they cannot but desire and, therefore, 
act as they do.  By contrast, human beings pursue their good consciously.  
They have rational desire.  A rational desire is a desire for something as 
good, worthwhile or of value.  An individual‟s complete set of rational 
desires will constitute his view of goodness.   
 In Aristotle's view of human action someone weighs up the situation 
and then forms an intention.  If nothing prevents the agent, at that point he 
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will act on his intention.  One thing that might prevent the agent is non-
rational desire.  As animals, human beings are capable of non-rational 
desire, and this may conflict with rational desire.  For example, a person 
may have an appetite to eat but a rational desire to lose weight.  The 
phenomenon of weakness of will occurs when someone acts on his appetite 
rather than his intention.  
 An individual‟s view of goodness will contain things he thinks are 
instrumentally valuable, such as the acquisition of wealth, as well as things 
that are intrinsically valuable, such as having pleasant experiences.  The 
key point is that the view of goodness is an agent‟s own, developed through 
a reasoning process.  Hence, rational desire is a product of an agent‟s 
judgment, not something given by nature.  By virtue of this reasoning, an 
agent with rational desire has control over what he desires to do, as well as 
what he does.  This is the crucial difference between animals and human 
beings.  It is the basis for our attribution of culpability for voluntary action.  
As such, it is the basis also of an Aristotelian account of autonomy.   
 Animals have non-rational desires and can, when unconstrained, act 
as they desire, but they have no control over what they desire.  Human 
beings, on the other hand, have a view of goodness.  This is the product of 
upbringing and ratiocinative processes.  As such, they have some control 
over what they desire.  Because reason plays this role in the formation of 
our view of goodness, people can be held responsible not only for what they 
do but also for what they desire.  When we hold someone morally 
responsible for a voluntary action it is primarily because we hold him 
responsible for his rational desire, his view of goodness, as well as his 
action.  On the Aristotelian account of autonomy, this control over desire as 
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well as action, which seems unique to humans, is what makes an agent 
autonomous, a self-ruler.   
 In many cases, as with a weak-willed agent, this self-rule is imperfect, 
but it is present nonetheless.  Furthermore, autonomous agents possess 
the state capacity for full rational control over desires, even though this is 
only actualised in a virtuous agent.  The degree of rational control that an 
agent actually possesses will be constitutive of his moral character.  This 
leaves untouched the problem of free will and determinism.  The account 
enables us to show how the presence of rational desire in human beings 
renders them autonomous and morally responsible.  It does not enable us 
to show whether or not someone's reason is determined.  
 Aristotle describes four broad character types within which there are 
a number of variations.  A virtuous agent has the right view of goodness 
and has no non-rational desires.  She only desires what it is right to desire, 
what she would rationally endorse.  A self-controlled agent has the right 
view of goodness but some non-rational desire that can conflict with it.  
However, he does not act upon these non-rational desires.  A weak-willed 
agent has the same structure of desires as a self-controlled agent.  
However, she does act upon her non-rational desires.  Finally, a vicious 
agent has the wrong view of goodness.  He has the wrong rational desires 
and acts upon them.  Aristotle believes most people to be somewhere 
between self-controlled and weak-willed.19 
 When an agent with moral character acts voluntarily, he expresses his 
character and can be held morally responsible for what he does.  For this 
reason, we can say that the quality in virtue of which someone is 
autonomous is the quality in virtue of which he possesses moral character.  
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Hence, an autonomous  agent must possess moral character and someone 
who possesses moral character must be an autonomous agent. 
 Two concerns arise in relation to this Aristotelian account of 
autonomy.  One concern relates to action that originates in the non-rational 
desires of some autonomous agents, in particular, weak-willed agents.  As 
we do not hold animals and young children morally responsible for actions 
that have their origin in non-rational desire, it would seem that this should 
be so also for similar actions by autonomous agents.  However, this is out 
of line with common beliefs about weakness of will and with Aristotle's 
explicit doctrine on the subject.  In response, an Aristotelian could say that 
a virtuous agent shows us that it is possible for all autonomous agents to 
gain rational control over their non-rational desires.  Similarly, the self-
controlled agent shows that, even in the presence of non-rational desire, an 
agent can be persuaded by reason.  Agents who do not gain control, or are 
not persuaded by reason, have, therefore, suffered a failure of reasoning 
that means they can be held morally responsible for the action that occurs 
as a consequence of the failure.   
 The other concern is that it seems reasonable to doubt the proposition 
that all agents are responsible for their view of goodness.  For example, 
someone who has suffered a particularly brutal upbringing might be 
thought incapable of being other than vicious.  In response, Aristotle does 
seem to acknowledge the possibility of upbringing ameliorating moral 
responsibility in two ways.  Someone may develop a bestial character due to 
a particularly brutal upbringing.  Aristotle's thought must be that 
upbringing in an environment where the true human good is universally 
eschewed will lead to bestial character.  Here the agent‟s badness "lies not 
in the corruption of the superior element … but in its absence.”20  An agent, 
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no matter how intelligent, brought up in such an environment could never 
be virtuous and hence cannot be blamed for his bestial character.  Another 
way in which upbringing may obviate moral responsibility is where it 
creates pockets of non-rational desire which are untouched by the rational 
processes of agents.  These are states of a bestial nature that arise due to 
disease, madness or habit, such as plucking the hair, biting nails or eating 
coal.  On Aristotle's account, someone with moral character may possess 
pockets of unnatural desire that give rise to such behavior.  The thought 
seems to be that these unnatural desires are untouched and untouchable 
by ratiocinative processes, unlike the desires associated with vice or 
weakness of will.  As the badness does not originate in the agent, he cannot 
be held responsible for the action.  In a similar way, agents cannot be held 
responsible for actions that result from alien desires.  A virtuous agent who 
develops Alzheimer's disease cannot be held responsible for his loss of the 
right vision of goodness or for his actions.   
 On Aristotle's view, then, an autonomous agent has moral character.  
Moral character is shown by the agent possessing a view of goodness 
developed through his own ratiocination.  The type of moral character is a 
function of the degree of rational control the agent has over his feelings and 
actions.  An autonomous action arises from the moral character of an 
autonomous agent.  Hence, an act that arises from alien or bestial desire is 
not autonomous, even though it is voluntary.  
 This account of the nature of autonomy allows us to explain the 
various beliefs and to resolve the puzzles.  It allows us to explain how 
autonomy is more than the capacity to act in an unconstrained way since it 
requires also the capacity for rational desire and intention.  It also allows 
us to explain why most adults are autonomous since most of us have this 
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capacity even though we do not fully develop it.  Most of us are not virtuous 
and practically wise.  It allows us to explain the two dimensions of 
autonomy since agents are autonomous if they have the relevant capacity 
and actions are autonomous when agents exercise this capacity.  It also 
allows us to explain the link between autonomy and moral agency since 
people are moral agents insofar as they have the capacity for rational 
desire, and rational desire is the core of autonomy.   
 There remains the puzzle regarding negligence. The key to an 
explanation lies in Aristotle's distinction between acting in ignorance and 
acting through ignorance.  Someone acts in ignorance if she does not know 
important particulars of the situation.  Someone acts through ignorance if 
she does not care to know important particulars of the situation.  
Essentially, a negligent act results from a failure to pay proper attention.  
Such a failure is a product of moral character.  It is acting through 
ignorance rather than in it.     
 
3. The value of autonomy 
A satisfactory account of autonomy must allow us to say why autonomy 
matters and why we should respect autonomy.  It should also allow us to 
say how much it matters and indicate how we should respond when 
autonomy clashes with other values.  From an Aristotelian perspective it is 
necessary to return to basic issues, in particular, the way in which an 
Aristotelian virtue ethics differs from other approaches such as Kantianism.  
Aristotelian virtue ethics has gradually re-entered the mainstream, partly 
through the work of G.E.M. Anscombe.  One of Anscombe‟s points is that 
the modern sense of “right” as in “morally right” does not occur in 
Aristotle.21  Aristotle does not have a notion of “moral” considerations or 
 13 
reasons to act distinct from other areas.  Aristotelian ethics is naturalistic.  
Anscombe invokes Aristotle in opposing the notion that there is a naturalist 
fallacy in ethics.  For Aristotle, the reasons we have to act in whatever way, 
for example, to be just to someone, to drink a glass of wine or to get 
married, all depend ultimately on the kind of creature we are.  Both 
Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre have developed explicitly naturalist 
accounts of virtue and ethics that draw upon Aristotle's naturalism and 
upon his essentialist biology.22 
 We must bear in mind this background of naturalism and 
essentialism when developing an Aristotelian account of the value of 
autonomy.  Onora O‟Neill‟s view is that the concept of individual autonomy 
is unable to bear the moral weight brought to it.  For example, we cannot 
employ it to show why poorly thought through decisions are as morally 
valuable as fully rational decisions.  An Aristotelian account does not need 
to allow us to do this as it does not provide us with a conception of goods 
having moral weight over and above their value to us qua rational, social 
animals.   
 Aristotle draws a connection between the terms “good” and “function” 
when developing his understanding of the good life for human beings.23  He 
asks what makes anything good.  For people with functions the answer is 
fairly straightforward.  A good plumber or musician is a person who fulfils 
the function of a plumber of musician well.  In doing this he exemplifies 
certain qualities, such as dexterity and attention to detail.  Aristotle terms 
such qualities, virtues.  If people had functions then a good life would be a 
life in which they functioned well.  On the face of it this seems implausible.  
However, Aristotle argues that all natural kinds have a function, which is to 
realise their essential potentials or properties.  An acorn is capable of 
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undergoing many changes.  It can become food or an ornament.  However, 
we understand what an acorn is only in terms of particular changes it may 
undergo in developing into an oak tree.  These changes are its essential 
potentials or properties.  The function of an acorn is to realise its essential 
property. 
 The same applies mutatis mutandis to people.  Our function is to 
realise our essential property.  By examining what makes human beings 
differ from other natural kinds, Aristotle argues that our essence lies in the 
fact that we are rational animals.  Our function is to live the life of a fully 
rational animal.  It follows that human virtues will either enable or 
instantiate such a life.  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle analyzes a 
number of virtues.  He says there are two main categories.  These are 
intellectual virtues which enable us to reason well and moral virtues which 
enable us to desire well.  He shows that the qualities we have come to 
believe to be human virtues enable us to function well as rational animals.  
Happiness will be more likely for someone with virtuous character than 
someone without a virtuous character.  Such a person is also more likely to 
realise what is best in life and to achieve it than someone lacking in human 
virtues.   
 If happiness is the highest good, constituted primarily in living a life 
of virtue, it is possible to discern the place of autonomy in a happy life: 
happiness requires both autonomy of agency and action.  An agent must be 
autonomous if she is to live a happy life.  This follows from the fact that 
virtue is a type of moral character.  Possession of moral character defines 
an autonomous agent.  If someone were not autonomous she could not 
possess virtue.  Autonomy is therefore necessary for happiness.  As well as 
this, in order for someone to live a happy life, she must exercise virtue 
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through her actions.  The actions must be voluntary and autonomous.  
Actions that are forced or performed through ignorance of particulars are 
not exercises of virtue.  A life predominantly made up of such involuntary 
acts could not be happy.  Similarly, acts that are based upon alien desires 
will not contribute to a happy life because while such acts are voluntary, 
they are not autonomous.  Thus, happiness requires autonomy of agency 
and of action.  Such autonomy is not sufficient for happiness.  Vicious 
agents possess both but do not live a happy life.  We may ask why we 
should value the autonomy of non-virtuous agents.  Perhaps we should 
override the autonomy of, say, weak-willed and vicious agents whose 
autonomous actions cannot contribute to a happy life.   
 However, autonomy of agency and action is of value to non-virtuous 
agents because it is necessary in order for them to develop virtue.24  Virtue 
is not an innate quality, it is a quality that may develop in someone, but it 
is up to the person whether it does or does not do so.  It arises by the 
person doing the sort of things that a virtuous person does and thereby 
becoming habituated to virtue.  This habituation to virtue is not simply the 
forced or unknowing repetition of particular acts, for two reasons.  Virtue 
involves forming the right intention as well as performing the right action.  
Someone who learns habitually to tell the truth but without the right 
intention will not develop virtue.  In addition, there is no single action, or 
set of actions, whose repetition could possibly habituate a person to virtue.  
Virtue is manifested in many ways.  A virtuous agent will act rightly in 
completely novel situations.  What will be common to all his actions will be 
that they are done because they are morally right, reflecting the agent‟s 
right intention and view of goodness.  It follows that in order to become 
virtuous a person must be habituated to choosing to do things because 
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they are morally right.  Moral rightness must become part of one‟s 
intention. 
 Autonomy is central to this process.  An agent who is forced to go 
through the motions of virtuous action will never develop virtue.  Similarly, 
an agent who is implanted with alien desire in order to act as a virtuous 
agent does will simply be left with a pocket of desire that is untouched by 
the agent‟s own ratiocination and which will have no effect on the rest of his 
view of goodness.  An agent must exercise autonomy in order to become 
virtuous.  
 Overall, this gives us three ways in which autonomy is a necessary 
component of happiness.  The first is that in order to be happy an agent 
must be an autonomous agent, that is, one with moral character.  The 
second is that a virtuous autonomous agent must, for the most part, act 
autonomously in order to be happy.  The third is that autonomy is central 
to developing the virtuous moral character that enables one to be happy.  
However, it is possible, indeed common, for autonomous agents to fail to be 
virtuous.  Therefore, autonomy is a necessary, but not sufficient component 
of happiness. 
 The Aristotelian account enables us to show that we have good reason 
to respect autonomy.  A virtuous agent could not lead a good or happy life if 
he did not have the quality of autonomy or if a significant proportion of his 
life were made up of non-autonomous action.  Neither, under such 
conditions, could non-virtuous agents ever develop virtue and, thereby, 
become happy.  However, it is clear that the nature of the contribution of 
autonomy to happiness will vary with the moral character of the agent.  If 
an agent is virtuous, then the contribution is direct.  If the agent is non-
virtuous, then the contribution is indirect; his autonomous action may 
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contribute to eventual changes in moral character that will enable him to 
become happy.   
 This difference will be marked, for an Aristotelian, by different types of 
respect for autonomy.  Acts that reflect virtuous moral character make a 
direct contribution to happiness.  Respect for autonomy in such cases will 
be shown by an attitude of respect in the sense of admiration.  This will be 
a hands-off respect in which others will, generally, have little to do other 
than desire to emulate and, occasionally, remove impediments to action.  
By contrast, self-controlled and weak-willed agents experience a conflict 
between their rational and non-rational desires.  With both types of 
character there is still a good prima facie reason for respecting autonomy, 
that such people must be permitted to act autonomously if they are to 
develop their character.  However, the way in which respect for autonomy is 
manifest in such cases will be different from the way it is manifest with 
virtue.  Both self-controlled and weak-willed agents are, in a sense, 
wavering.  A self-controlled person is in danger of giving in to non-rational 
desire.  A weak-willed person might be persuaded to follow his rational 
desire.  In such circumstances, we should seek to support the rational 
desire of the person.  More colloquially, we should try to get the person to 
see reason.  For example, we might try to dissuade someone struggling to 
control his alcohol intake from meeting at a bar. 
 The contribution to happiness of acts reflecting vice is the least direct 
of the four main character types.  Nonetheless, vicious agents are likely to 
be discontent in various ways.  Essentially, a vicious agent rationally 
endorses his non-rational desires, making them his rational desires.  There 
is no reason to expect the non-rational desires to form a unified view of 
goodness.  A vicious agent may have an appetite to eat to excess, be 
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excessively promiscuous, and drink too much.  He may also want to do this 
over a full life.  All such desires may lead him in different directions, and 
the satisfaction of one of them may sabotage the satisfaction of another.  
For example, the obesity and illness caused by intemperate eating and 
drinking may sabotage his plans to live long.  Thus, even a vicious agent 
may come to reflect on his life and change.  Again, therefore, the main role 
of others would seem to be to respect the autonomy of a vicious agent but 
also to try to get the person to see reason.  Thus there is always a strong 
prima facie case for respecting autonomy.  However, the nature of the 
respect will vary depending upon the character type manifested by the 
particular autonomous action.   
 Autonomy is not only of instrumental value in happiness.  For 
Aristotle, happiness is largely comprised of on an active life of virtue for 
which autonomy is necessary.  To that extent it is intrinsically valuable.  
Indeed, autonomous action is of instrumental value even where an action is 
not good or right action.  However, this is not to side with liberals for whom 
autonomy is of supreme value such that paternalism is always 
objectionable.  On an Aristotelian account, it is sometimes permissible to 
stop people when they are making bad judgments.  Some choices may be so 
destructive that they remove the autonomy of an individual and hence the 
ability to develop his moral character.25   
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